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Kwok-Tung Lo, Member, IEEE
Abstract— In this paper, some existing perceptual encryption
algorithms of MPEG videos are reviewed and some problems,
especially security defects of two recently proposed MPEG-
video perceptual encryption schemes, are pointed out. Then,
a simpler and more effective design is suggested, which selec-
tively encrypts fixed-length codewords (FLC) in MPEG-video
bitstreams under the control of three perceptibility factors. The
proposed design is actually an encryption configuration that
can work with any stream cipher or block cipher. Compared
with the previously-proposed schemes, the new design provides
more useful features, such as strict size-preservation, on-the-fly
encryption and multiple perceptibility, which make it possible
to support more applications with different requirements. In
addition, four different measures are suggested to provide better
security against known/chosen-plaintext attacks.
Index Terms— perceptual encryption, MPEG, fixed-length
codeword (FLC), cryptanalysis, known/chosen-plaintext attack
I. INTRODUCTION
The wide use of digital images and videos in various
applications brings serious attention to the security and privacy
issues today. Many different encryption algorithms have been
proposed in recent years as possible solutions to the protection
of digital images and videos, among which MPEG videos
attract most attention due to its prominent prevalence in
consumer electronic markets [1]–[5].
In many applications, such as pay-per-view videos, pay-
TV and video on demand (VoD), the following feature called
“perceptual encryption” is useful. This feature requires that
the quality of aural/visual data is only partially degraded by
encryption, i.e., the encrypted multimedia data are still par-
tially perceptible after encryption. Such perceptibility makes it
possible for potential users to listen/view low-quality versions
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Fig. 1. A diagrammatic view of the perceptual encryption.
of the multimedia products before buying them. It is desirable
that the aural/visual quality degradation can be continuously
controlled by a factor p, which generally denotes a percentage
corresponding to the encryption strength. Figure 1 shows a
diagrammatic view of perceptual encryption. The encryption
key is kept secret (not needed when public-key ciphers are
used) but the control factor p can be published.
Regarding the visual quality degradation of the encrypted
videos, the following points should be remarked: 1) since
there does not exist a well-accepted objective measure of
visual quality of digital images and videos, the control factor
is generally chosen to represent a rough measure of the
degradation; 2) the visual quality degradations of different
frames may be different, so the control factor works only in an
average sense for all videos; 3) the control factor is generally
selected to facilitate the implementation of the encryption
scheme, which may not have a linear relationship with the
visual quality degradation (but a larger value always means a
stronger degradation); 4) when the control factor p = 1, the
strongest visual quality degradation of the specific algorithm
(i.e., of the target application) is reached, but it may not be
the strongest degradation that all algorithms can produce (i.e.,
all visual information of the video is completely concealed).
In recent years, some perceptual encryption schemes have
been proposed for G.729 speech [6], [7], MP3 music [8], JPEG
images [9], [10], wavelet-compressed (such as JPEG2000)
images and videos [11]–[13] and MPEG videos [14]–[17],
respectively. The selective encryption algorithms proposed in
[18]–[20] can be considered as special cases of the percep-
tual encryption for images compressed with wavelet packet
decomposition. In some research papers, a different term,
“transparent encryption”, is used instead of “perceptual en-
cryption” [16], [17], emphasizing the fact that the encrypted
multimedia data are transparent to all standard-compliant
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decoders. However, transparency is actually an equivalent
of another feature called “format-compliance” (or “syntax-
awareness”) [21], [22], which does not mean that some partial
perceptible information in plaintexts still remains in cipher-
texts. In other words, a perceptual cipher must be a transparent
cipher, but a transparent cipher may not be a perceptual cipher
[5]. Generally, perceptual encryption is realized by selective
encryption algorithms with the format-compliant feature. This
paper chooses to use the name of “perceptual encryption” for
such a useful feature of multimedia encryption algorithms.
More precisely, this paper focuses on the perceptual encryption
of MPEG videos. After identifying some problems of the ex-
isting perceptual encryption schemes, a more effective design
of perceptual MPEG-video encryption will be proposed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section will provide a brief survey of related work and
point out some problems, especially problems existing in two
recently-proposed perceptual encryption algorithms [16], [17].
In Section III, the video encryption algorithm (VEA) proposed
in [23] is generalized to realize a new perceptual encryption
design for MPEG videos, called the perceptual VEA (PVEA).
Experimental study is presented in Sec. IV, to show the
encryption performance of PVEA. The last section presents
the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK AND EXISTING PROBLEMS
A. Scalability-based perceptual encryption
Owing to the scalability provided in MPEG-2/4 standards
[24], [25], it is natural to realize perceptual encryption by
encrypting the enhancement layer(s) of an MPEG video (but
leaving the base layer unencrypted) [14]. However, since
not all MPEG videos are encoded with multiple layers, this
scheme is quite limited in practice. More general designs
should be developed to support videos that are compliant to
the MPEG standards.
B. Perceptual encryption for JPEG images
Due to the similarity between the encoding of JPEG images
[26] and the frame-encoding of MPEG videos [24], [25], [27],
the ideas of perceptual encryption for JPEG images can be
easily extended to MPEG videos.
In [9], two techniques of perceptual encryption were stud-
ied: encrypting selective bit-planes of uncompressed gray-
scale images, and encrypting selective high-frequency AC
coefficients of JPEG images, with a block cipher such as DES,
triple-DES or IDEA [28]. The continuous control of the visual
quality degradation was not discussed, however.
In [10], the perceptual encryption of JPEG images is real-
ized by encrypting VLCs (variable-length codewords) of par-
tial AC coefficients in a ZoE (zone of encryption) to be other
VLCs in the Huffman table. The visual quality degradation is
controlled via an encryption probability, p/100 ∈ [0, 1], where
p ∈ {0, · · · , 100}. This encryption idea is similar to the video
encryption algorithm proposed in [22]. The main problem with
encrypting VLCs is that the size of the encrypted image/video
will be increased since the Huffman entropy compression is
actually discarded in this algorithm.
C. Perceptual encryption for wavelet-compressed images and
videos
In [11]–[13], several perceptual encryption schemes for
wavelet-compressed images and videos were proposed. Under
the control of a percentage ratio q, sign bit scrambling and
secret permutations of wavelet coefficients/blocks/bit-planes
are combined to realize perceptual encryption. The problem
with these perceptual encryption schemes is that the secret
permutations are not sufficiently secure against known/chosen-
plaintext attacks [29]–[32]: by comparing the absolute values
of a number of plaintexts and ciphertexts, one can reconstruct
the secret permutations. Once the secret permutations are
removed, the encryption performance will be significantly
compromised.
D. Perceptual encryption of motion vectors in MPEG-videos
In [15], motion vectors are scrambled to realize perceptual
encryption of MPEG-2 videos. Since I-frames do not depend
on motion vectors, such a perceptual encryption algorithm can
only blur the motions of MPEG videos. It cannot provide
enough degradation of the visual quality of the MPEG videos
for encryption (see Fig. 3 of this paper). Generally speaking,
this algorithm can be used as an option for further enhancing
the performance of a perceptual encryption scheme based on
other techniques.
E. Pazarci-Dipc¸in scheme
In [16], Pazarci and Dipc¸in proposed an MPEG-2 perceptual
encryption scheme, which encrypts the video in the RGB color
space via four secret linear transforms before the video is
compressed by the MPEG-2 encoder. To encrypt the RGB-
format uncompressed video, each frame is divided into M ×
M scrambling blocks (SB), which is composed of multiple
macroblocks of size 16 × 16. Assuming the input and the
output pixel values are xi and xo, respectively, the four linear
transforms are described as follows:
xo =


αxi, (D,N) = (0, 0),
FS − αxi, (D,N) = (0, 1),
FS(1− α) + αxi, (D,N) = (1, 0),
FS − [FS(1− α) + αxi], (D,N) = (1, 1),
(1)
where α = α∗/100 (α∗ ∈ {50, · · · , 90}) is a factor con-
trolling the visual quality degradation, D,N are two binary
parameters that determine an affine transform for encryption,
and FS means the maximal pixel value (for example, FS =
255 for 8-bit RGB-videos). The value of α in each SB is
calculated from the preceding I-frame, with a function called
α-rule (see Sec. 2.2 of [16] for more details). The α-rule
and its parameters are designated to be the secret key of this
scheme.
The main merit of the Pazarci-Dipc¸in scheme is that the
encryption/decryption and the MPEG encoding/decoding pro-
cesses are separated, which means that the encryption part can
simply be added to an MPEG system without any modification.
However, the following defects make this scheme problematic
in real applications.
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1) Unrecoverable quality loss caused by the encryption
always exists, unless α = 1 (which corresponds to no
encryption). Even authorized users who know the secret
key cannot recover the video with the original quality.
Although it is claimed in [16] that human eyes are not
sensitive to such a quality loss if α is set above 0.5, it
may still be undesirable for high-quality video services,
such as DVD and HDTV. In addition, limiting the value
of α lowers the security and flexibility of the encryption
scheme.
2) The compression ratio may be significantly influenced
by encryption if there are fast motions in the plain
videos. This is because the motion compensation al-
gorithm may fail to work for encrypted videos. The
main reason is that the corresponding SBs may be
encrypted with different parameters. To reduce this kind
of influence, the encryption parameters of all SBs have
to be sufficiently close to each other. This, however,
compromises the encryption performance and the secu-
rity.
3) The scheme is not suitable for encrypting MPEG-
compressed videos. In many applications, such as VoD
services, the plain-videos have already been compressed
in MPEG format and stored in digital storage media
(DSM). In this case, the Pazarci-Dipc¸in scheme becomes
too expensive and slow, since the videos have to be
first decoded, then encrypted, and finally encoded again.
Note that the re-encoding may reduce the video quality,
since the encoder is generally different from the original
one that produced the videos in the factory. Apparently,
this defect is a natural side effect of the merit of the
Pazarci-Dipc¸in scheme.
4) The scheme is not secure enough against brute-force
attacks. For a given color component C of any 2 × 2
SB structure, one can exhaustively guess the α-values
of the four SBs to recover the 2 × 2 SB structure,
by minimizing the block artifacts occurring between
adjacent SBs. For each color component of a SB, the
value of α∗ = 100α ∈ {50, · · · , 90}, D ∈ {0, 1} and
N is determined by D, so one can calculate that the
searching complexity is only (41×2)4 ≈ 225.4, which is
sufficiently small for PCs1. Once the value of α of an SB
is obtained, one can further break the secret key of the
corresponding α-rule. For the exemplified α-rule given
in Eq. (3) of [16], the secret key consists of the addresses
of two selected subblocks (of size P ×P ) in a 2×2 SB
structure, and a binary shift value ∆ ∈ {5, 50}. Because
∆ can be uniquely determined from D, one only needs
to search other part of the key, which corresponds to
a complexity of
(
3× (2M/P )
2
)2
. When P = M
2
, the
complexity is 482 = 2304 ≈ 211.2, and when when
P = M
4
it is 1922 = 36864 ≈ 215.2. Apparently, the
key space is not sufficiently large to resist brute-force
attacks, either. In addition, since the values of quality
factors and the secret parameters corresponding to the
1Even when α∗ ∈ {0, · · · , 100}, the searching complexity is only (101×
2)4 ≈ 230.6 , which is still practically small.
three color components can be separately guessed, the
whole attack complexity is only three times of the above
values, which is still too small from a cryptographical
point of view [28]. Although using multiple secret keys
for different SBs can increase the attack complexity
exponentially, the key size will be too long and the key-
management will become more complicated. Here, note
that the α-rule itself should not be considered as part of
the key, following the well-known Kerckhoffs’ principle
in modern cryptography [28].
5) The scheme is not sufficiently sensitive to the mismatch
of the secret key, since the encryption transforms and
the α-rule given in [16] are both linear functions. This
means that the security against brute-force attacks will
be further compromised, as an approximate value of α
may be enough to recover most visual information in
the plain-video.
6) The scheme is not secure enough against known/chosen-
plaintext attacks. This is because the value of α can be
derived approximately from the linear relation between
the plain pixel-values and the cipher pixel-values in the
same SB. Similarly, the value N can be derived from the
sign of the slope of the linear map between xi and xo,
and the value of D can be derived from the value range
of the map. Furthermore, assuming that there are k secret
parameters in the α-rule, if more than k different values
of α are determined as above, it is possible to uniquely
solve the approximate values of the k secret parameters.
To resist known/chosen-plaintext attacks, the secret key
has to be changed more frequently than that suggested
in [16] (one key per program), which will increase the
computational burden of the servers (especially the key-
management system).
F. Wang-Yu-Zheng scheme
A different scheme working in the DCT domain (between
DCT transform and Huffman entropy coding) was proposed
by Wang, Yu and Zheng in [17], which can be used as an alter-
native solution to overcome the first two shortcomings of the
Pazarci-Dipc¸in scheme. By dividing all 64 DCT coefficients
of each 8× 8 block into 16 sub-bands following the distance
between each DCT coefficient and the DC coefficient, this new
scheme encrypts the j-th AC coefficient in the i-th sub-band
as follows:
b′ij =
{
bij − ⌊βai⌋, bij ≥ 0,
bij + ⌊βai⌋, bij < 0,
(2)
where bij and b′ij denotes the plain pixel-value and the cipher
pixel-value, respectively, β ∈ [0, 1] is the control factor, ai
is the rounding average value of all AC coefficients in the
i-th sub-band, and ⌊·⌋ means the rounding function towards
zero. The DC coefficients are encrypted in a different way, as
b′
0
= b0±⌊Cβa0⌋, where a0 = b0 and C ∈ [0, 1] is the second
control factor2. The value of ai can also be calculated in a
more complicated way to enhance the encryption performance,
2Note that the rounding function is missed in Eqs. (3) and (4) of [17]. In
addition, Eq. (4) of [17] should read b′
0
= b0±⌊Cβa0⌋, not b′0 = a0±Cβ.
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following Eqs. (5) and (6) in [17], where three new parameters,
k1, k2, k3 are introduced to determine the values of ai for the
three color components, Y, Cr and Cb. The 16 average values,
a0 ∼ a15, the two control factors, β and C, and the three extra
parameters (if used), k1, k2, k3, altogether serve as the secret
scrambling parameters (i.e., the secret key) of each SB. Three
different ways are suggested for the transmission of the secret
parameters: a) encrypting them and transmitting them in the
payload of TS (transport stream); b) embedding them in the
high-frequency DCT coefficients; c) calculating them from the
previous I-frame in a way similar to the α-rule in [16].
In fact, the Wang-Yu-Zheng scheme is just an enhanced
version of the Pazarci-Dipc¸in scheme, without amending all
shortcomings of the latter scheme. Precisely, the following
problems still remain.
1) Though the reduction of the compression ratio about
motion compensations is avoided, the encryption will
change the natural distribution of the DCT coefficients
and thus reduce the compression efficiency of the Huff-
man entropy encoder. For example, when each sub-band
has only one non-zero coefficient, it is possible that all
64 coefficients become non-zero after the encryption.
This significantly increases the video size. In addition,
if the secret parameters are embedded into the high-
frequency DCT coefficients for transmission, the com-
pression performance will be further compromised.
2) The scheme is still not sufficiently sensitive to the
mismatch of the secret parameters, since the encryption
function and the calculation function of ai are kept
linear. It is still not sufficiently secure against brute-
force attacks to the secret parameters, because of the
limited values of ai, β, C, k1, k2, k3. Furthermore, due
to the non-uniform distribution of the DCT coefficients
in each sub-band, an attacker needs not to randomly
search all possible values of ai.
3) This scheme is still insecure against known/chosen-
plaintext attacks if the third way is used for calculating
the secret parameters. In this case, ai of each SB can
be easily calculated from the previous I-frame of the
plain-video. Additionally, since the value of ⌊βai⌋ can
be obtained from bij−b′ij , the secret parameter β can be
derived approximately. In a similar way, the secret pa-
rameter C can also be derived approximately. If ai is cal-
culated with k1, k2, k3, the values of β, k1, k2, k3 can be
solved approximately with a number of known/chosen
AC coefficients in four or more different sub-bands, so
that C can be further derived from one known/chosen
DC coefficient.
4) The method of transmitting the secret parameters in the
payload of the transport stream cannot be used under the
following conditions: a) the key-management system is
not available; b) the video is not transmitted with the TS
format. A typical example is the perceptual encryption
of MPEG-video files in personal computers.
III. MORE EFFICIENT DESIGN OF PERCEPTUAL
MPEG-VIDEO ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
Based on the analysis given above, we propose a simpler
design of perceptual encryption for MPEG videos, and attempt
to overcome the problems in existing schemes. The following
useful features are supported in our new design.
• Format-compliance: the encrypted video can still be de-
coded by any standard-compliant MPEG decoder. This is
a basic feature of all perceptual encryption schemes.
• Lossless visual quality: the encrypted video has the same
visual quality as the original one, i.e., the original full-
quality video can be exactly recovered when the secret
key is presented correctly.
• Strict size-preservation: the size of each data element in
the lowest syntax level, such as VLCs, FLCs and contin-
uous stuffing bits, remains unchanged after encryption.
When the video stream is packetized in a system stream
(i.e., PS or TS), the size of each video packet remains
unchanged after encryption. This enables the following
useful features in applications:
– independence of bit-rate types (VBR and FBR);
– avoiding some time-consuming operations when en-
crypting MPEG-compressed videos: bit-rate control,
re-packetization of the system stream and the re-
multiplexing of multiple audio/video streams;
– on-the-fly encryption: a) direct encryption of MPEG-
compressed video files without creating temporary
files, i.e., one can open an MPEG video file, read the
bitstream and simultaneously update (encrypt) it; b)
instantaneous switching encryption on/off for online
video transmission;
– ROI (region on interest) encryption: selectively en-
crypting partial frames, slices, macroblocks, blocks,
motion vectors and/or DCT coefficients within spe-
cific regions of the video.
• Independence of optional data elements in MPEG
videos: the perceptibility is not obtained by encrypting
optional data elements, such as quantiser matrix and
coded block pattern3. This means that the scheme can
encrypt any MPEG-compliant videos with a uniform
performance.
• Fast encryption speed: a) the extra computational load
added by the encryption is much smaller than the com-
putational load of a typical MPEG encoder; b) MPEG-
compressed videos can be quickly encrypted without
being fully decoded and re-encoded (at least the time-
consuming IDCT/DCT operations are avoided).
• Easy implementation: the encryption/decryption parts can
be easily incorporated into the whole MPEG system,
without major modification of the structure of the codec.
• Multi-dimensional perceptibility: the degradation of vi-
sual quality is controlled by multi-dimensional factors.
• Security against known/chosen-plaintext attacks is en-
sured by four different measures.
3Strictly speaking, motion vectors are also optional elements in MPEG
videos, so the scheme should not encrypt only motion vectors as did in [15].
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To the best of our knowledge, some of the above features
(such as on-the-fly encryption) have never been discussed in
the literature on video encryption, in spite of their usefulness
in real applications.
With the above features, the perceptual encryption scheme
becomes more flexible to fulfill different requirements of vari-
ous applications. To realize the strict size-preservation feature,
the encryption algorithm has to be incorporated into the MPEG
encoder, i.e., the (even partial) separation of the cipher and the
encoder is impossible. This is a minor disadvantage in some
applications. However, if the re-design is sufficiently simple,
it is worth doing so to get a better tradeoff between the overall
performance and the easy implementation. In the case that the
re-design of the MPEG codec is impossible, for example, if
the codec is secured by the vendor, a simplified MPEG codec
can be developed for the embedding of the perceptual video
cipher. Since the most time-consuming operations in a normal
MPEG codec including DCT/IDCT and picture reconstruction,
are excluded from the simplified MPEG codec, fast encryption
speed and low implementation complexity of the whole system
can still be achieved.
In the following text of this section, we describe the design
principle along with different methods of providing security
against known/chosen-plaintext attacks, and discuss several
implementation issues.
A. The new design
This design is a generalized version of VEA [23] for
perceptual encryption, by selectively encrypting FLC data
elements in the video stream. Apparently, encrypting FLC
data elements is the most natural and perhaps the simplest
way to maintain all needed features, especially the need for
the strict size-preservation feature. The proposed scheme is
named PVEA – perceptual video encryption algorithm. Note
that PVEA can also be considered as an enhanced combination
of the encryption techniques for JPEG images proposed in [9],
[10] and the perceptual encryption of motion vectors [15].
There are three main reasons for selecting only FLC data
elements for encryption.
1) As analyzed below, all existing VLC encryption algo-
rithms cannot be directly used to provide a controllable
degradation of the quality. New ideas have to be devel-
oped to adopt VLC encryption in perceptual encryption
schemes.
• VLC encryption with different Huffman tables [23],
[33]–[38]: Since each VLC-codeword is a pair of
(run, level), if a VLC-codeword is decoded to get
an incorrect “run” value, then the position of all
the following DCT coefficients will be wrong. As a
result, the visual quality of the decoded block will
be degraded in an uncontrollable way. Thus, it is
difficult to find a factor to control such visual quality
degradation. Moreover, if the Huffman tables do
not keep the size of each VLC-entry as designated
in [33]–[37], syntax errors may occur when an
unauthorized user decodes an encrypted video. This
means that the encryption cannot ensure the format
compliance to any standard MPEG codecs.
• VLC-index encryption [21], [22]: This encryption
scheme can ensure format compliance, but still
suffers from the uncontrollability of the visual qual-
ity degradation due to the same reason as above.
Another weakness of VLC-index encryption is that
it may influence the compression efficiency and
bring overhead on video size.
• Shuffling VLC-codewords or RLE events before the
entropy encoding stage [22], [39]: This algorithm
can ensure both the format compliance and the strict
size-preservation. However, even exchanging only
two VLC-codewords may cause a dramatic change
of the DCT coefficients distribution of each block.
So, this encryption algorithm cannot realize a slight
degradation of the visual quality and fails to serve
as an ideal candidate for perceptual encryption.
2) It is obvious that FLC encryption is the simplest way
to achieve all the desired properties mentioned in the
beginning of this section, especially to achieve format
compliance, strict size-preservation and fast encryption
simultaneously. For example, naive encryption4 can
realize strict size-preservation and fast encryption, but
cannot ensure format compliance.
3) As will be seen below, using FLC encryption is suffi-
cient to fulfill the needs of most real applications for
perceptual encryption.
According to MPEG standards [24], [25], [27], the follow-
ing FLC data elements exist in an MPEG-video bitstream:
• 4-byte start codes: 000001xx (hexadecimal);
• almost all information elements in various headers;
• sign bits of non-zero DCT coefficients;
• (differential) DC coefficients in intra blocks;
• ESCAPE DCT coefficients;
• sign bits and residuals of motion vectors.
To maintain the format-compliance to the MPEG standards
after the encryption, the first two kinds of data elements
should not be encrypted. So, in PVEA, only the last four FLC
data elements are considered, which are divided into three
categories according to their contributions to the visual quality:
• intra DC coefficients: corresponding to the rough view
(in the level of 8× 8 block) of the video;
• sign bits of non-intra DC coefficients and AC coefficients,
and ESCAPE DCT coefficients: corresponding to details
in 8× 8 blocks of the video;
• sign bits and residuals of motion vectors: corresponding
to the visual quality of the video related to the motions
(residuals further corresponds to the details of the mo-
tions).
Based on the above division, three control factors, psr, psd, and
pmv in the range [0,1], are used to control the visual quality in
three different dimensions: the low-resolution rough (spatial)
view, the high-resolution (spatial) details, and the (temporal)
4In the image/video encryption literature, the term “naive encryption”
means to consider the video as a 1-D bitstream and encrypt it via a common
cipher.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 17, NO. 2, PAGES 214-223, FEBRUARY 2007 6
motions. With the three control factors, the encryption proce-
dure of PVEA can be described as follows:
1) encrypting intra DC coefficients with probability psr;
2) encrypting sign bits of non-zero DCT coefficients (ex-
cept for intra DC coefficients) and ESCAPE DCT coef-
ficients with probability psd;
3) encrypting sign bits and residuals of motion vectors with
probability pmv .
The encryption of selected FLC data elements can be carried
out with either a stream cipher or a block cipher. When a
block cipher is adopted, the consecutive FLC data elements
should be first concatenated together to form a longer bit
stream, then each block of the bit stream is encrypted, and
finally each encrypted FLC data element is placed back into
its original position in the video stream. Under the assumption
that the stream cipher or block cipher embedded in PVEA
is secure, some special considerations should be taken into
account in order to ensure the security against various attacks,
as discussed below.
In the above-described PVEA, the three factors control the
visual quality, as follows:
• psr = 1 → 0: the spatial perceptibility changes from
“almost imperceptible” to “perfectly perceptible” when
psd = 0 or to “roughly perceptible” when psd > 0;
• psr = 0, psd = 1→ 0: the spatial perceptibility changes
from “roughly perceptible” to “perfectly perceptible”;
• pmv = 1 → 0: the temporal (motion) perceptibility (for
P/B-pictures only) changes from “almost imperceptible”
to “perfectly perceptible”.
The encryption may bring the recovered motion vectors out of
the spatial range of the picture, so the motion compensation
operations (or even the involved picture itself) may be simply
discarded by the MPEG decoder. In this case, the temporal
(motion) perceptibility will be “perfectly imperceptible”, not
just “almost imperceptible”.
In the Appendix of [23], it was claimed that the DC
coefficients of each block can be uniquely derived from the
other 63 AC coefficients. This means that the perceptual
encryption of DC coefficients must not be used alone, i.e.,
some AC coefficients must also be encrypted to make the
encryption of the DC coefficients secure. It was lately observed
that this claim is not correct [40]. In fact, the DC coefficient
of a block means the average brightness of the block, and
is independent of the other 63 AC coefficients. Thus, the
DC-encryption and AC-encryption of PVEA are independent
of each other, i.e., the two control factors, psr and psd, are
independent of each other, and they can be freely combined
in practice.
B. Security against ciphertext-only attacks and a constraint of
the control factor
The format compliance of perceptual encryption makes it
possible for the attacker to guess the values of all encrypted
FLC data elements separately in ciphertext-only attacks. The
simplest attack is to try to recover more visual information
by setting all the encrypted FLC data elements to zeros.
This is called error-concealment-based attack (ECA) [22]. Our
experimental results have shown that PVEA is secure against
such attack. More details are given in the next section.
To guess the value of each FLC data element, one can also
employ the local correlation existing between adjacent blocks
in each frame. That is, one can search for a set of all encrypted
FLC data elements in each frame to achieve the least blocking
artifact. Does such a deblocking attack work? Now let us try to
get a lower bound of this attack’s complexity, by assuming that
the number of all FLC data elements in each frame is N , which
means that the number of encrypted FLC data elements is
pN . Then, the complexity of the deblocking attack will not be
less than O
((
N
pN
)
2pN
)
, since each FLC data elements has at
least two candidate values. So, if
(
N
pN
)
2pN is cryptographically
large, the deblocking attack will not compromise the security
of PVEA. As a lower bound of p corresponding to a typical
security level, one can get p ≥ 100/N by assuming 2pN ≥
2100. For most consumer videos that need to be protected
via perceptual encryption, N is generally much larger than
100, so this constraint on p generally does not have too much
influence on the overall performance of PVEA. Because the
complexity 2pN is much over-estimated5, the constraint can be
further relaxed in practice. For example, when N = 200, the
above condition suggests that p ≥ 100/N = 1/2. However,
calculations showed that p ≥ 9/100 is enough to ensure a
complexity larger than O(2100).
Since it is generally impractical to carry out the deblocking
attack on the whole frame, another two-layer deblocking attack
may be adopted by the attacker: 1) performing the deblocking
attack on small areas of the frame; 2) for all candidates of
these small areas, performing the deblocking attack on the
area-level again. Though this two-layer attack generally has a
much smaller complexity than the simple attack, its efficiency
is still limited due to the following reasons.
• For each small area, the number of encrypted FLC ele-
ments is generally not equal to pN∗, where N∗ denotes
the total number of all FLC elements in the area. Thus,
even this number has to be exhaustively guessed and then
validated by considering the numbers of other areas (i.e.,
the whole frame). The existence of three independent
quality factors makes the attack even more complicated.
• For small each areas, the probability that the least de-
blocking result does not correspond to the real scene may
not very small. Accordingly, the attacker has to mount a
more loose deblocking attack, thus leading to a higher
attacking complexity.
• Even for the smallest area of size 16 × 16, there are
generally more than one hundred FLC elements (i.e.,
N∗ ≥ 100), especially when there are rich visual in-
formation included in the area.
• If the number of FLC elements in an area is relatively
small, this area generally contains less significant visual
information (such as a smooth area).
• The smaller each area is, the more the number of fake
results will be, and then the more the complexity of the
5There are two reasons about the over-estimation: 1) the omission of ` N
pN
´
,
which is very large when N ≫ pN and pN is not very small; 2) some FLC
elements (such as intra DC coefficients) have more than 2 candidate values.
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second stage will be.
Of course, with the two-layer deblocking attack, the attacker
can have a chance to recover a number of small areas, though
he/she generally cannot get the whole frame. Such a minor
security problem is an unavoidable result of the inherent
format-compliance property of the perceptual encryption algo-
rithms and related to the essential disadvantage of perceptual
encryption exerted on some special MPEG-videos (see the
discussion on Fig. 5 in the next section).
C. Security against known/chosen-plaintext attacks
Generally speaking, there are four different ways to provide
security against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. Users can
select one solution for a specific application.
1) Using a block cipher: With a block cipher, it is easy to
provide security against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. Since
the lengths of different FLC data elements are different, the
block cipher may have to run in CFB (cipher feedback) mode
with variable-length feedback bits to realize the encryption.
Note that n-bit error propagation exists in block ciphers
running in the CFB mode [28], where n is the block size
of the cipher. It is also possible to cascade multiple FLC
data elements to compose an n-bit block for encryption, as
in RVEA [23, Sec. 7]. Compared to the CFB mode, the latter
encryption mode can achieve a faster encryption speed (with a
little more implementation complexity for bit cascading), since
in the CFB mode only one element can be encrypted in each
run of the block cipher.
2) Using a stream cipher with plaintext/ciphertext feedback:
After encrypting each plain data element, the plaintext or
the ciphertext is sent to perturb the stream cipher for the
encryption of the next plain data element. In such a way, the
keystream generated by the stream cipher becomes dependent
on the whole plain-video, which makes the known/chosen-
plaintext attacks impractical. Note that an initial vector is
needed for the encryption of the first plain data element.
3) Using a key-management system and a stream cipher:
When a key-management system is available in an application,
the encryption procedure of PVEA can be realized with a
stream cipher. To effectively resist known/chosen-plaintext at-
tacks, the secret key of the stream cipher should be frequently
changed by the key-management system. In most cases, it
is enough to change one key per picture, or per GOP. Note
that this measure needs more computational load with higher
implementation cost, and is suitable mainly for encrypting
online videos.
4) Using a stream cipher with UID: When key-
management systems are not available in some applications, a
unique ID (UID) can be used to provide the security against
known/chosen-plaintext attacks by ensuring that the UIDs are
different for different videos. The UID of an MPEG-video
can be stored in the user data area. The simplest form of
the UID is the vendor ID plus the time stamp of the video.
It is also possible to determine the UID of a video with a
hash function or a secure pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG). In this case, the UIDs of two different videos may
be identical, but the probability is cryptographically small if
the UID is sufficiently long. The UID is used to initialize the
stream cipher together with the secret key, which ensures that
different videos are encrypted with different keystreams. Thus,
when an attacker successfully gets the keystream used for n
known/chosen videos, he cannot use the broken keystreams to
break other different videos. Of course, the employed stream
cipher should be secure against plaintext attacks in the sense
that the secret key cannot be derived from a known/chosen
segment of the long keystream that encrypts the whole video
stream [28].
D. Implementation issues
Since PVEA is a generalization of VEA, it is obvious that
fast encryption speed can be easily achieved, as shown in
[23]. In addition, by carefully optimizing the implementation,
the encryption speed can be further increased. We give two
examples to show how to optimize the implementation of
PVEA so as to increase the encryption speed.
A typical way to realize the probabilistic quality control
with a decimal factor p is as follows: generate a pseudo-
random decimal, r ∈ [0, 1], for each data element with a
uniformly-distributed PRNG, and then encrypt the current
element only when r ≤ p. The above implementation can be
modified as follows to further increase the encryption speed:
1) pseudo-randomly select Np = round(N · p) integers
from the set {0, · · · , N − 1};
2) create a binary array SE[0] ∼ SE[N ]: SE[i] = 1 if the
integer i is selected; otherwise, SE[i] = 0;
3) encrypt the i-th FLC data element only when SE[i mod
N ] = 1.
In this modified implementation, only a modulus addition and
a look-up-table operation are needed to determine whether the
current data element should be encrypted. As a comparison, in
the typical implementation, one run of the PRNG is needed for
each data element, which is generally much slower. Although
N bits of extra memory is needed to store the array in
the modified implementation, it is merely a trivial problem
since video codec generally requires much more memory. To
ensure the security against deblocking attacks, in the modified
implementation the value of N should not be too small6.
To further reduce the computational load of PVEA, another
way is to selectively encrypt partial FLC data elements. Two
possible options are as follows: 1) encrypt only intra blocks;
2) encrypt only sign bits (or a few number of most significant
bits) of intra DC coefficients, ESCAPE DCT coefficients, and
residuals of motion vectors. The above two options can also
be combined together. This will have very little effect on the
encryption performance, since an attacker can only recover
video frames with a poor visual quality from other unencrypted
data elements [22], [41].
IV. ENCRYPTION PERFORMANCE OF PVEA
Some experiments have been conducted to test the real
encryption performance of PVEA for a widely-used MPEG-
1 test video, “Carphone”. The encryption results of the 1st
6In most cases, it is enough to set N ≥ 300.
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a) b) c)
d) e) f)
g) h) i)
Fig. 2. The encryption results of the 1st frame in “Carphone”: a)
(psr , psd) = (0, 0) – the plain frame; b) (psr , psd) = (0, 0.2); c)
(psr , psd) = (0, 1); d) (psr, psd) = (0.2, 0); e) (psr, psd) = (0.2, 0.2); f)
(psr , psd) = (0.5, 0.5); g) (psr , psd) = (1, 0); h) (psr , psd) = (1, 0.2); i)
(psr , psd) = (1, 1).
a) b) c)
Fig. 3. The encryption results of the 313th frame in “Carphone”: a)
(psr , psd, pmv) = (0, 0, 0) – the plain frame; b) (psr, psd, pmv) =
(0, 0, 0.5); c) (psr , psd, pmv) = (0, 0, 1).
frame (I-type) are shown in Fig. 2, with different values of
the two control factors psr and psd. It can be seen that the
degradation of the visual quality is effectively controlled by
the two factors. The encryption results of the third control
factor pmv are given in Fig. 3, where the 313th frame (B-type)
is selected for demonstration. It can be seen that encrypting
only the motion vectors will not cause much degradation in
the visual quality.
Our experiments have also shown that PVEA is secure
against error-concealment based attacks. For two encrypted
frames shown in Fig. 2, the recovered images after applying
ECA are shown in Fig. 4. In Fig. 4a, the sign bits of all
AC coefficients are set to be zeros, and in Fig. 4b all DC
coefficients are also set to be zeros. It can be seen that the
visual quality of the recovered images via such an attack is
even worse than the quality of the cipher-images, which means
that ECA cannot help an attacker get more visual information.
Actually, the security of PVEA against ECA depends on the
fact that an attacker cannot tell encrypted data elements from
un-encrypted ones without breaking the key. As a result, he
has to set all possible data elements to be fixed values, which
a) b)
Fig. 4. The recovered results after applying ECA for the 1st frame in
“Carphone”: a) breaking Fig. 2c; b) breaking Fig. 2i.
is equivalent to perceptual encryption with the control factor
1, i.e., the strongest level of perceptual encryption.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that PVEA has a minor
disadvantage that the degradation in the visual quality is
dependent on the amplitudes of the intra DC coefficients.
As an extreme example, consider an intra picture whose DC
coefficients are all zeros, which means that the FLC-encoded
differential value of each intra DC coefficient does not occur
in the bitstream, i.e., only the VLC-encoded dct dc size=0
occurs. In this case, the control of the rough visual quality by
psr completely disappears. Similarly, when dct dc size=1, the
encryption can only change the differential value from ±1 to
∓1, so the degradation will not be very significant. As a result,
this problem will cause the perceptibility of some encrypted
videos become “partially perceptible” when psr = 1 (should
be “almost imperceptible” for most videos). For an MPEG-
1 video7 with a dark background (i.e., with many intra DC
coefficients of small amplitudes), the encryption results are
shown in Fig. 5. Fortunately, this problem is not so serious in
practice, for the following reasons:
• most consumer videos contain sufficiently many intra DC
coefficients of large amplitudes;
• even when there are many zero intra DC coefficients, the
content of the video has to be represented by other intra
DC coefficients of sufficiently large amplitudes;
• the differential encoding can increase the number of non-
zero intra DC coefficients;
• the partial degradation caused by psr and the degradation
caused by psd and pmv are enough for most applications
of perceptual encryption (see Figs. 2 and 5).
From this minor disadvantage of PVEA, a natural result can
be immediately derived: for the protection of MPEG videos
that are highly confidential, VLC data elements should also be
encrypted. In fact, our additional experiments on various video
encryption algorithms have shown that it might be impossible
to effectively degrade the visual quality of the MPEG videos
with dark background via format-compliant encryption, unless
the compression ratio and the strict size-preservation feature
are compromised. The relations among the encryption per-
formance, the compression ratio, the size-preservation feature,
and other features of video encryption algorithms, are actually
much more complicated. These problems will be investigated
in our future research.
7Source of this test video: http://www5.in.tum.de/forschung/visualisierung/du
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a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 5. The encryption results of the 169th frame in an MPEG-1 video:
a) (psr , psd, pmv) = (0, 0, 0) – the plain frame; b) (psr, psd, pmv) =
(1, 0, 0); c) (psr , psd, pmv) = (1, 1, 0); d) (psr, psd, pmv) = (1, 1, 1).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on the problem of how to realize
perceptual encryption of MPEG videos. Based on a compre-
hensive survey on related work and performance analysis of
some existing perceptual video encryption schemes, we have
proposed a new design with more useful features, such as
on-the-fly encryption and multi-dimensional perceptibility. We
have also discussed its security against deblocking attack and
pointed out some measures against known/chosen-plaintext
attack. The proposed perceptual encryption scheme can also
be extended to realize non-perceptual encryption by simply
adding a VLC-encryption part.
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